Abstract: This paper aims at foregrounding the Kantian conception of mental illness as a “disorder and deviation from the rule of the use of reason” (AA 07:216) and thus to examine this peculiar meaning of mental illness as a pathology of consciousness, where the latter is understood as the central structure of subjectivity guiding its theoretical, practical, and aesthetic actions. The starting point of this analysis is Kant’s systematic presentation of mental illnesses in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), which I will explore alongside his Lectures on Anthropology. Specific attention will be paid to the common symptom Kant identifies in every form of mental illness, the “loss of common sense (sensus communis)” (AA 07:219). According to the investigation of the Critique of Judgment, this entails the lack of the “necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge” (AA 05:239) and thus a distancing from the sphere of public reason which, in turn, undermines consciousness’ abilities of aesthetic reflection and political action. I will explore the specific meaning of illness as a transgression of the private into the public, i.e. the obfuscation of an enlightened, shared, and collectively-instantiated reason. The goal is that of exploring the meaning of illness, as an incapacity to appropriately adopt maxims of the common intellect, and therefore an inability “to think for oneself”, the shrinkage of a “enlarged thought” and the impossibility to “always act consistently” (AA 05:294).

Keywords: Mental Illness; Disorder and Deviation; Pathology of Consciousness; Loss of Common Sense; Public Reason.

Abstract: This paper aims to show how Hegel’s interest in magnetic pathologies led him to focus on the mind-body problem as well as on the relation between rationality and preconsciousness. By analyzing the physiological side or basis of the magnetic state, it will emerge that these pathologies afflict both mind (Seele) and body. A closer look at the description of the organic disease given in the Philosophy of Nature will reveal that the psychic pathologies that Hegel describes in the Anthropology result from an uncontrolled reactivation of the subject’s preconscious dimension. Indeed, Hegel does not deny the existence of magnetic phenomena, but considers them as alterations of the feeling soul. In conclusion, the essay intends to show that the study of magnetism helped Hegel developing a philosophical psychology that differs from rational and empirical psychology, considering human subjects as embodied beings.
Keywords: Hegel; Anthropology; Animal Magnetism; Somnambulism; Mind-body Problem.

p. 61, MARIANNINA FAILLA, Dormire, vegliare e sognare: le vie della follia nell’antropologia di Hegel

Abstract: The essay starts from the role that the sleep/wake relationship plays in the sentimental dynamics: perceptive and judgmental, therefore at the dawn of the forms of self-awareness of the individual soul. We are in the context of the concrete feeling of self. In this context madness involves the contrast between the organic relationality of each psycho-body activity, what we could indicate as the totality of the concrete feeling of self, and sclerotization and fixation in the perceptual particularity imposed by the body to the idealizing activity of the soul. Madness, however, does not only involve the opposition between the particularity and the organic totality of the psycho-body unity, it also concerns the opposition between order and disorder. If the first mode interrupts the positive relationship between sleep and wakefulness, the second unravels the boundary between wakefulness and dream. Describing these two “ways of madness”, the essay, in its conclusion, indicates the feminine-maternal role (Mutter) and the universal masculin role (Mensch), also the two moments of genius, in the relationship between conscious and unconscious.

Keywords: Sleep; Wake; Dream; Madness; Genius; Mother.

p. 79, ROSSELLA BONITO OLIVA, Nelle pieghe del soggettivo. La trama longitudinale e trasversale dello psichico

Abstract: Philosophy of the Subjective Spirit is an important theme in Hegel’s work. It thoroughly permeated his studies: a matter of continuous reworking in its specific subject. It is recalled in the philosophies of law, religion, history, and in the science of logic. Each of these moments, from soul to spirit, from unconscious to spirit, requires the philosopher’s observation and attention. It is not about creating a hierarchy or a progression, but rather observing an open scene, in which adventures and misadventures of Subjectivity evolve. This activity involves exploring a depth that goes beyond the mere subjectivity, and the individual’s psychology. It is movement and stillness at the same time. Once again it’s about weaving speakable and unspeakable, conscious and unconscious, temporary and ageless, processes and blocks. Only by dialectically crossing the regions of unconsciousness, preconscious, conscious, and intelligent life form’s collective process of determination that we can translate the other from the spirit to other of the spirit.

Keywords: Subjectivity; Soul; Spirit; Mythology of Reason; Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.

p. 99, FABIO SULPIZIO, La crisi della malinconia. Philosophie e medicina in Philippe Pinel

Abstract: For Philippe Pinel, the concept of melancholy is one of the key methods for understanding not only a specific mental illness but also the new map of mental alienation. However, as Hegel shows in his work, the madness is not only a moment of growth in the history of the mind, but also a pattern of scientific intellect that builds a new science of the mind that is a science of humanity. It is the melancholy, however, with its complex and rich history, which represents the testbed of the nascent psychiatry: the epistemological crisis caused by the inquiry into the nature of melancholy started, which with Pinel, will force both medicine and philosophy to build anew the moral science, only recently born with Pinel and Esquirol. This new foundation will be possible only by meditating on the history of the conception of melancholy and its relation to the antique and modern philosophical and scientific thought.
Keywords: Pinel; Hegel; Melancholy; Madness; Psychiatry.

p. 119, SEHRII GRYSHKAN, Dialektisch-spekulatives Konzept der psychischen Norm in der Psychoanalyse

Abstract: There is a controversial question in psychology in general and in psychoanalysis in particular concerning the definition of what is a psychic norm. This article aims to make a contribution to this discussion. The thesis of the article could be formulated in the following way: The psychic norm in Freud’s works corresponds to dialectic-speculative processes whereas the pathological, although it is also dialectic in its essence, does not reach a speculative level. I support this thesis in the following way: (1) Firstly, I briefly summarize what Hegel means by positive-rational or speculative thinking, whereby I refer mostly to the corresponding section of his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences. (2) Subsequently, I distinguish, on the basis of the preceding chapter, between three types of concepts: the abstract, the dialectical and the speculative one. Further, I use these terms to show (3) how the normal outcome of the Oedipus complex and (4) sublimation as a desirable drive destiny have a speculative character, and subsequently that (5) psychoanalytic psychotherapy itself seeks for a speculative resolution of conflicts. At the end (6) I summarize the results obtained and (7) discuss the difference between Freud’s and Hegel’s metaphysical points of view in spite of the demonstrated similarities concerning their understanding of the logical.

Keywords: Dialectics; Freud; Hegel; Psychic Norm; Psychoanalysis.

p. 131, ROBERTO FINELLI, Una metafisica troppo ‘nobile’ del desiderio: A. Kojève e J. Lacan

Abstract: It is indisputable the enormous influence on French culture that had the Hegelian reading advanced by A. Kojève during the 30s of the last century. Finelli’s essay intends to criticize the basic approach of the Russian-French author and his claim to place the dialectical relationship of lord and servant at the beginning of history. Finelli’s aim is to demonstrate that the “absolute denial”, assigned to the lord in the Phenomenology of the spirit, cannot be a presupposition, as Kojève thought, but can only be a “place”, historically determined, which finds his reasons in the figures and in the previous path of Phenomenology. The more general critical intent is to show how Kojève’s Hegelian interpretation is conditioned by a Nihilism, which is articulated according to the influence of the Metaphysics of the Non-existent of Soloviev and the ontological difference of Heidegger. With the consequence that a good part of contemporary French Theory (Lacan, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault) reveals itself, on closer inspection, strongly exposed to the dissolutive action of an ontology of “Nothing”.

Keywords: Kojève; Lacan; Nihilism; French Theory.

p. 147, DANIELA ANGELUCCI, Real and immanence in cinema

Abstract: The pair Real and Immanence makes reference to two concepts employed respectively by the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the philosopher Gilles Deleuze. My proposal is that there is a strong affinity between these two concepts, and that they can contribute to clarifying a specific capacity of art, in particular that of cinema. According to scholars who criticize the application of psychoanalysis to the arts, psychoanalysis always misses what should be its object – the work of art – studying the artist’s unconscious (or characters’ unconscious) or the unconscious of the viewers. I think, rather, that it is possible to study the phenomenon of art using some psychoanalytical concepts, at the same time considering art in its formal
procedures and not only in its narrative or figurative contents. I believe that considering artistic content as if it was a shell containing the unconscious of the author that leads fatally to a failure of interpretation. Instead, observing and pointing out the similarities between ordinary psychic processes and the experiences that we all have of art, cinema, in this case, is a decisive step towards clarifying some aspects of its nature and its features. In such a perspective, aesthetic experience is an experience that cannot be dissolved in ordinary life, because it maintains its own specificity, but it is not totally separate (something considered as a luxury, something that you can consider at the end, when the needs of other more “serious” dimensions of our existence have been satisfied). During the aesthetic experience of a work of art, or that of a film rich with aesthetic qualities, the constituent aspects of nature and human life appear visible, enhanced, intensified, and reconfigured. I therefore propose to think in this way the interplay between aesthetics and psychoanalysis, on the questions of the Real and Immanence: aesthetic experience is a space where some psychic processes of ordinary experience appear in a more intense way.

**Keywords:** Real; Immanence; Lacan; Deleuze; Aesthetic; Psychoanalysis.

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p. 159, Ugo Balzeretti, *Hegel and Foucault on Rameau’s Nephew. The Discrimen between Madness and Mental Illness as Biopolitical Threshold*

**Abstract:** In dealing with the Hegelian conception of folly, Michel Foucault does not focus primarily on the anthropology of the *Encyclopedia* that praised Philippe Pinel’s therapeutic revolution. Foucault is more interested in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and in its interpretation of Diderot’s satire *Rameau’s Nephew.* Accordingly, he investigates madness not on the basis of the *soul* as the still natural state of consciousness, but rather in the heart of the spirit itself when it is already articulated as social praxis, language and institutions. Madness, thus, no longer represents simply a fall back to nature, but rather the truth of reason beyond reason; not merely *mental illness* but *folly,* as well. At the same time, modern psychopathology finds itself challenged by its good right to judge madness. The *science of man* which it claims to be based on turns out to be an anthropological reductionism inspired bio-medically, an *anthropiatry* which can be defined precisely with reference to the distinction between *mental illness* and *madness* that it constitutively ignores. This paper investigates the possibility of treating the discrimen between *mental illness* and *madness* as a threshold to biopolitics. It considers not only Foucault’s reading of Hegel’s Diderot interpretation, but also a broader constellation of thinkers and figures, all of whom have interpreted and experienced madness as the most intimate ratio of reason and not just as its *object:* from Thomas Mann’s *Doktor Faustus* to Hölderlin’s *Empedocles,* from Maurice Blanchot to Karl Jaspers and Ludwig Binswanger.

**Keywords:** Madness; Mental Illness; Biopolitics; Hegel; Foucault.

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p. 177, Francesco Lesce, *La presenza alienata. Follia e slancio morale in Ernesto De Martino*

**Abstract:** In De Martino’s work pathological alienation is defined as the modus particular to a sick mind, which exposes the human presence to the extreme risk of a crisis that the sane mind is called to avert incessantly. It is within this horizon that culture becomes the instrument of a constant struggle against folly’s annihilating interference in history. It is, however, insufficient to elicit the issue of folly without specifying that in De Martino folly evokes the extreme limit of a crisis varyingly articulated on multiple levels. In the rereading of these themes it is useful to be mindful of two fundamental aspects. Firstly, the differing
typological forms in which the ‘crisis of presence’ is declined, with ‘history’ as their regulatory reference. On the other hand there is the particular role played by art (modern literature especially), as the locus where pathological crisis and cultural-historical crisis are at risk of becoming indiscernible from one another. In light of this, a comparative assessment of the different ways in which the concept of alienation is articulated will be attempted. There will thus be a distinction between α) a positive alienation, which is practiced by magic-religious institutions; β) a negative alienation, in the pathological sense, represented by the experience of folly; γ) a second negative alienation, of a cultural kind, determined by the development of industrial societies.

**Keywords:** De Martino; Alienation; Ethos; Psicopatology; Presence.

**Varia**

p. 195, Francesco Fistetti, *Le ambivalenze e i paradossi della rivoluzione dei diritti: una storia filosofica e politica*

**Abstract:** The object of this essay is the paradox of the philosophical and political history that emerged from May 1968. The instances of liberation, born under the pressure of that epochal event and aimed at the destruction of the traditional authoritarian morality (divorce, abortion, feminism, LGBT movements, etc.), have been emptied of their original emancipatory content and caught by the abstract logic of the market. For a sort of irony of history, the revolution of subjective rights has been turned upside down in new forms of subjugation and hierarchy. The ambivalence of this historical-political process is reflected in the post-structuralist and post-modernist philosophical constellation of the so-called “French Theory” (Derrida, Foucault, Baudrillard, Deleuze, Lyotard, Barthes), in which the Anglo-American “studies” (women studies, queer studies, postcolonial studies, etc.) are inscribed in the decades 1980/1990.

**Keywords:** Post-structuralism; Post-modernism; Deconstructionism; Recognition; Gift.

p. 213, Eleonora Piromalli, *Le radici del riconoscimento. Un viaggio con Axel Honneth nella storia delle idee europea*

**Abstract:** This article focuses on Axel Honneth’s latest book, *Recognition: A European History of Ideas*. I summarize Honneth’s reconstruction of the three models of recognition that he associates respectively with the French, the British and the German theoretical tradition, and his attempt at integrating the German model with the other two. In retracing Honneth’s itinerary through the development of the idea of recognition, I also present some objections: these concern Honneth’s neglect, in *Recognition*, of the philosophy of the first French and British socialists, as well as the fact that the one expounded in *Recognition* is only a philosophical, intellectual history of this idea, and not also, as in my opinion would have been advisable, a social history of recognition (with reference to authors such as E.P. Thompson, Barrington Moore, George Rudé). These omissions are even more paradoxical considering that Honneth’s previous book, *The Idea of Socialism*, extensively focused on the ideas of the first French socialists, while his reflections on recognition dating from the ’80 and the ’90 owe much to social history.

**Keywords:** Recognition; Rousseau; Smith; Hegel; Social History; Socialism.
Abstract: In this paper, after considering the difference between Bergson and Heidegger in interpreting the problem of ‘nothing’, I will opt for Bergson’s viewpoint which claims that the ‘nothing’ is just a pseudo-idea originated by the linguistic faculty of negation. Then I will consider Wittgenstein and Croce’s approach to such a problem, which consists in using logic in order to dissolve it. Finally, I will interpret religion as an alternative way by which the ‘nothing’ is removed by concealing it.

Keywords: Henri Bergson; Benedetto Croce; Martin Heidegger; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Negatio; Religion.

Abstract: This essay treats of the therapeutic role of narrative in trauma survivors’ path to recovery, as described by the psychiatrist Judith Herman in her Trauma and Recovery. It underlines the analogies between Herman’s scientific acquisitions, reflecting her clinical work with victims of domestic violence, veterans and political prisoners, on the one hand, and Paul Ricoeur’s theory of the circle of triple mimesis, on the other. Furthermore, the essay compares Herman’s view of forgiveness as impossible “exorcism” of the traumatic experience, with the post-Holocaust debate about forgiveness, referring to Arendt’s and Ricoeur’s works and Godobo-Madzikela’s witnessing of the unexpected emergence of forgiveness in the context of TRC Committees in South Africa. The focus on forgiveness sheds light on the pivotal role played by empathy not only in the therapist’s room but also in the court of a tribunal, and on the socio-political dimension of the work of memory and narrative. Indeed, public testimonies and confrontations between the victim and her perpetrator may awake empathic capabilities in both of them, who otherwise may be trapped to the past and plunged into a never-ending spiral of violence.

Keywords: Trauma; Forgiveness; Narrative; Judith Herman; Paul Ricoeur; Hannah Arendt.

Abstract: The paper is based on the question of the relationship between phenomenology and logic to offer a first general view about the problem of the origin of dialectic in the thought of Bertrando Spaventa. Metaphysics, according with its most ancient and noble function, could still offer the instruments to arrive at the truth, but only provided that the work on the foundation of realism, which identify in the sensitive perception the “bridge” which conduct from the being to the knowledge, and that affirm the identity of the content as being and as knowledge, that is the truth itself.

Keywords: Dialectic; Logic; Being; Thought; Reality.